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Abstract 
 
Advanced postindustrialization generates numerous challenges for the European social 
model. Central among these challenges is the problem of addressing new risks associated with 
employment and skills of semi and unskilled workers. In this chapter, I assess the partisan basis 
of support for social policies that address the needs of these marginalized workers. I specifically 
consider the impacts of postindustrial cleavages among core constituencies of social democratic 
parties on the capacity of these parties to pursue inclusive social policies. I argue - and find 
support for in empirical analyses - that encompassing labor organization is the most important 
factor in strengthening the ability of left parties to build durable and electorally successful 
coalitions in support of outsider-friendly policies. I go beyond existing work on the topic by 
considering the full array of postindustrial cleavages and electoral challenges facing left parties, 
by more fully elaborating the logic of why encompassing labor organization is crucial, and by 
considering a more complete set of measures of outsider policies than extant work. I compare my 
arguments and findings to important new work that stresses coalition building and partisan 
politics but minimizes the role of class organization.  
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1 Introduction 
 Advanced postindustrialization generates numerous challenges for the European social 
model. Central among these is the rise of “new social risks” not well covered by core social 
insurance programs of the Twentieth Century welfare state. These risks include threats to income 
and job security for semi and low-skilled workers generated by skilled-biased technological 
change, globalization, and related forces as well as new socioeconomic pressures on households 
that seek to balance work and family commitments and meet the skill/knowledge challenges of 
the postindustrial economy. Those new risks associated with employment and skills, often 
analyzed through the lens of labor market dualism, has been the subject of intense study.1 In 
addition, advanced postindustrialization creates pressures on the unity of the political coalitions 
that undergird the European social model; this chapter will pay particular attention to this 
contemporary political challenge.  
 Generally, the literature on dualization stresses the bifurcation of postindustrial labor 
markets between insiders (e.g., skilled industrial sector workers) and outsiders, namely, younger, 
female, immigrant and less skilled workers increasingly concentrated in the service sector and on 
the unemployment rolls. Significant differences in wages and income, the incidence of 
involuntary part-time employment, and access to social insurance, services, job training and 
education characterize the divergent conditions faced by insiders and outsiders (e.g., Rueda 
2007; Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk 2012; Swank 
2014).  
                                                 
1 See David Rueda (2005; 2007) for the first major analysis of the political ramifications of labor market dualism, 
especially the impacts on social democratic parties (see below for the specifics of this argument).  See Emmenegger 
et al (2012) for analysis of major features of labor market dualism and summaries of the large social science 
literature of the topic.  
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 In this chapter, I assess the partisan basis of support for social policies that address the 
needs of marginalized workers. Following contributors in the seminal work of Amingeon and 
Bonoli (2006), I specifically consider the impacts of postindustrial cleavages among core 
constituencies of social democratic parties on the capacity of these parties to pursue inclusive 
social policies. (Indeed, one of the most important contributions of Klaus Armingeon has been to 
pioneer the study of the political consequences of the rise of new social risks.) I argue that 
encompassing labor organization is the most important factor in strengthening the ability of left 
parties to build durable and electorally successful coalitions in support of outsider-friendly 
policies. I go beyond existing work on the topic by considering the full array of postindustrial 
cleavages and attendant electoral challenges facing left parties, by more fully elaborating the 
logic of why encompassing labor organization is crucial, and by considering a more complete set 
of measures of social and labor market policies than extant work. In concluding, I compare my 
arguments and findings to “new politics of the welfare state” research as well as to important 
new work that stresses coalition building and partisan politics but minimizes the role of class 
organization.  
1.1 An Overview of Labor Market Outsider Policies and Outcomes 
I focus on three dimensions of public policy specifically oriented to ameliorating the 
economic hardships of labor market outsiders in the postindustrial labor market. The first two 
policies are directed toward income protection for low income households: average income 
replacement rates of unemployment compensation across single and two earner households at 50 
percent of the average production worker earnings and minimum income protection for 
outsiders. Minimum income protection is the sum of means-tested cash assistance plus family 
services and housing subsidies averaged across single, lone-parent, and two-parent households as 
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a percent of the average production worker’s wage.2 In addition, I focus on the magnitude of 
national commitments for active labor market policy (hereafter ALMP), or ALMP spending as a 
percentage of GDP. AMLP programs include provision of an array of labor market services (e.g., 
job search assistance), training for major categories of labor market outsiders (e.g, unemployed 
youth, low-skilled workers displaced by globalization and technological change), and publicly 
subsidized jobs. 3  I also include an analysis of the reduction in the relative poverty rate through 
income transfers and taxes. I use 50 percent of median income as the poverty line and compute 
poverty reduction as the percentage change from pre-tax-and-transfer to post-tax-and-transfer 
poverty rates. The poverty rate, itself, is defined as the percentage of working-age households 
earning below 50 percent of median family income.4 With this focus, I go beyond existing 
studies that have nearly exclusively focused on ALMP and general unemployment benefits as 
indicators of outsider policies (e.g., Rueda 2005; 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2015a).  
-Table 1 about here- 
 I display data for these four dimensions of outsider policies and outcomes in Table 1. The 
table provides values for the mid-1980s and early 2010s for the 18 focal nations of this study 
(grouped by welfare state regimes).5 Generally, as even casual observers would expect, Nordic 
social democratic welfare states score moderately higher in all areas. In both the 1980s and 
2010s, the Nordic countries replace several percentage points more income for low wage 
workers through unemployment compensation and minimum protection programs than do the 
                                                 
2 This measure taps the likely social wage available to younger and irregularly employed workers who do not meet 
or have exhausted eligibility requirements for normal unemployment compensation.  
3 Models of ALMP and minimum income protection estimated here update and extend (with new controls, new tests, 
corrected measures for some explanatory variables, and more years in the case of ALMP) initial analysis reported in 
Swank (2014). 
4 See the Appendix  for data sources for all variables used in this chapter. 
5 I exclude the both the Mediterranean countries because of sporadic data availability as well as Central and Eastern 
European countries because of the time frame of this study. 
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continental (conservative) welfare states; the difference in these policies between Nordic and 
Anglo-liberal welfare states is in excess of 20 percentage points. A similar pattern holds with 
regard to all dimensions of outsider policies and outcomes.  
 In addition, and surprisingly, change on each dimension in each welfare state type is, for 
the most part, remarkably modest across early and late postindustrial periods. In fact, the 
aggregate averages for mid-1980s and early 2010s for all 18 nations differs by only one 
percentage point (i.e., in percent of income replaced) for low wage worker unemployment 
compensation and means-tested benefits. ALMP spending is identical in the mid-1980s and early 
2010s while pre- to post-fisc poverty reduction only increases by four percentage points. That 
said, there are some notable changes within countries and welfare state types. For instance, while 
still relatively generous, minimum income support declines in the Nordic cases, unemployment 
compensation for low income workers increases notably in Italy and Switzerland and declines by 
more than 10 points in New Zealand, and ALMP spending declines by half or more in New 
Zealand and the UK. I now turn to the widely debated question of how politics and, specifically, 
how partisan politics, has shaped these programs and outcomes in the postindustrial era.  
2 Theory: Parties, Labor Organization, and Social Protection of 
Outsiders 
 
 Beyond the analysis of the nature of new social risks, contributors to Amingeon and 
Bonoli (2006) focused on the implications of these risks for parties’ electoral strategies, 
ideological orientations, and, most central to this chapter’s inquiry, partisan impacts on social 
policy, itself. To begin, I consider the question of how partisan politics has influenced support 
for policies that aid labor market outsiders in light of the broader debate over whether or not 
“parties still matter” for social welfare policy.   
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 The first wave of studies on partisan government impacts on post-WW II social welfare 
policy consistently reported large positive impacts of social democratic (and to a more limited 
extent Christian democratic) government on national resource commitments to social protection 
(e.g., Cameron 1978; Stephens 1979; contributors to Castles 1982; Hicks and Swank 1992; 
Huber, Reagan, and Stephens 1993).6 Yet, in the wake of 1970s and 1980s economic crises and 
postindustrialization, a group of scholars led by Paul Pierson (1994; 1996) questioned continued 
partisan policy effects. In this view, the new politics of welfare policy under postindustrial 
pressures for austerity and efficiency involved the politically difficult job of reducing 
concentrated benefits to well-defined, mobilized constituencies in return for future, diffuse 
benefits. In the face of continued political support for social programs, incumbent politicians had 
to engage in the politics of blame avoidance where the success of reform depends on the 
character of program constituencies, the depth of lock-in effects of programs, and related 
programmatic traits. The partisan hue of governments have minimal impacts on policy reforms. 
 Beyond Piersonian “new politics” dynamics, welfare state scholars have highlighted three 
important conflicts among postindustrial constituencies of Left parties that may well undercut 
their ability to enact inclusive social and labor market policies. First, contributors to Armingeon 
and Bonoli (2006) as well as contemporary scholars (e.g., Häusermann, Pirot, and Geering 2012; 
Gingrich and Häusermann 2015) highlight the divergent interests between important new 
middleclass groups on the one hand, and traditional welfare state constituencies on the other. To 
elaborate, these scholars stress that younger, better educated, disproportionately female socio-
cultural professionals, increasingly important numerically to social democratic parties, prefer 
                                                 
6 As is commonly understood, scholars typically emphasized the balance of class power where labor mobilization 
through union organization, corporatist institutions, and left party rule signaled the relative advantage of low versus 
high income strata and the likelihood of redistribution (see Korpi [1983] for a classic statement).. 
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social investment spending on family services and supports, education, and activation policies. 
Although lower-skilled blue collar workers have an interest in ALMP programs, they and the 
broader working class have a strong preference for maintenance or expansion of income 
protection through the programs of the “traditional” welfare state.  
 Second, scholars have argued that a new conflict has emerged among key constituent 
groups of left parties as a function of changes in postindustrial occupational structures. As 
mentioned above, David Rueda (2005; 2007) has argued that with respect to social democratic 
parties’ constituencies, postindustrial labor markets increasingly consist of insiders (skilled 
industrial sector workers) and outsiders (younger, female, immigrant and less skilled workers 
increasingly concentrated in the service sector). Iversen and Soskice (2015a) make a similar 
point by noting that in the postindustrial production process, skilled and unskilled workers – 
heretofore intertwined in the structure of industrial production and politically integrated in a 
progressive social democratic-led coalition – are increasingly separated and dispersed across 
enterprises and sectors.7 
 For Rueda, the interests of insiders are in the maintenance of employment protection and 
the moderation of taxation of labor income, while outsiders favor both income transfers for 
short-term security and active labor market programs for human capital development and, 
ultimately, secure employment. Rueda argues that in the absence of rises in unemployment and 
risks that threaten insiders, social democratic parties will maintain employment protection and 
moderate tax burdens but not increase transfers and active labor market programs (with their 
                                                 
7 For Iversen and Soskice (2015a), the challenge for social democrats is to forge a new electoral coalition between 
low-skilled workers increasingly concentrated in services, remaining high skilled blue collar workers, and middle 
tier technicians and managers. As articulated in their past work (Iversen and Soskice 2006), the authors argue that 
this new lower and middle class coalition is most likely in PR systems (especially those with strong secular right 
parties and without significant Christian Democratic parties), where left parties may credibly commit to a 
redistribution. Iversen and Soskice to do not fully account for programmatic divisions between new middle class and 
traditional working class constituencies; they ignore the universalism-particularism cleavage discussed below.  
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associated tax burdens) that enhance the incomes of outsiders. Generally, Rueda and 
collaborators (e.g., Lindvall and Rueda 2014) stress the complex electoral dilemma facing social 
democrats. Social democratic shifts to insider and middle class appeals risk outsider defections 
(e.g, 1998 Swedish parliamentary elections); often left parties respond by returning to policy 
orientations that encompass outsider interests (e.g., 2006 and 2010 Swedish parliamentary 
elections).  
 Third, Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2015), among others, 
adopt a different perspective and stress that while economic conflicts still divide Left party 
constituencies, a strong univeralism-particularism dimension of cultural conflict creates 
additional, serious electoral dilemmas for social democrats. As noted, Left parties increasingly 
rely on the support of socio-cultural professions who work in education, health, and family and 
cultural services; these citizens prefer policies that promote an inclusive, multicultural, and 
participatory society. Yet, social democrats must balance policies for this constituency with those 
for blue collar wage earners who tend to favor exclusionary and traditionalist if not authoritarian 
socio-cultural policies.  
-Figure 1 about here- 
 Figure 1 highlights these three conflicts – and sets of tradeoffs – as well as the positions 
of three central constituency groups of contemporary social democratic parties. While the degree 
of difficulty in coalition building will vary depending on the absolute and relative size of these 
groups in each nation, among other factors, left parties will in all likelihood have to strategically 
adjudicate multiple conflicts to create an electorally successful coalition behind an inclusive, 
solidaristic social policy. I now turn to an analysis of the conditions under which left parties are 
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likely to be more successful in navigating these conflicts and, in turn, building coalitions around 
an inclusive social and labor market policy mix.   
2.1 Labor Organization.  
My central hypothesis is that encompassing labor organization, namely, high levels of 
union density, centralization of powers over constituent unions in one or a few peak associations, 
and state integration of unions (advisory boards, commissions, tripartite concertation; social 
program administration), provides a central mechanism through which social democratic parties 
can mitigate postindustrial cleavages and, in turn, build effective egalitarian coalitions. I make 
this argument for several reasons. In doing so, I build on Hou (2009) who has argued in his study 
of ALMP that encompassing labor movements moderate the tradeoffs faced by social democratic 
parties as they seek to balance the interests of insider and outsider groups. I also build on Thelen 
(2014) has who recently shown that labor organization is a key factor in Danish governments’ 
ability to embed market liberalization in policies that promote extensive human capital 
development and preserve social protection. Encompassing labor organization effectively 
brought together white collar, public sector, skilled manufacturing, and low-skill service workers 
(mitigating the insider-outsider and social investment-social insurance divides) in support of 
“embedded flexibilization.” I expand and elaborate the logic of these as well as my own recent 
arguments (Swank 2014; Martin and Swank 2012) and provide new evidence on the role of labor 
organization in facilitating left party promotion of social protections for outsiders.  
First, union density is very important. As Hou (2009) and Iversen and Soskice (2015b) 
have noted, unions disseminate political information and provide forums for political discussion. 
This, in turn, fosters a better understanding of material interests by members and the capacity of 
members to make informed political choices. Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), moreover, make 
the crucial point that unions’ behavior and rhetoric create distributive norms (fairness, aversion 
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to inequality) that members adopt as their own. In fact, Mosimann and Pontusson demonstrate in 
empirical analyses of individual-level data in 21 European democracies that union membership 
has a strong, positive effect on support for redistribution and that this effect increases with 
members’ income. Rennwald and Pontusson (2017) also show, and this is especially relevant to 
the universalism-particularism divide, that union membership significantly lowers the probability 
that working class voters who defect from social democratic parties vote for right-wing populist 
parties.  
 High levels of overall union density should also effectively incorporate many outsiders 
into the labor movement. Indeed, scholars have stressed that where unions remain relatively 
encompassing (Nordic countries and Belgium), public sector and low-wage service sector unions 
(and hence women, younger, and low-skilled workers) are represented alongside core sector 
industrial unions and white collar workers (e.g., Ebbinghaus 2006; Huo 2009). In fact, the simple 
correlation between aggregate union density and the ratio of outsider to insider unionization rates 
is .56 in a sample of 15 European political economies in 2008 (Beecher and Pontusson 2011).  
 In addition, union centralization (that is, extensive control over political-economic 
strategies and behaviors of constituent unions by one or a few national peak associations) should 
reinforce the inclusiveness of relatively densely organized union movements. As Gordon (2015) 
has pointed out, highly centralized union movements have strong norms for the democratic 
representation of all constituent unions (including low-skilled unions) in peak association 
decision making. Moreover, centralized peak associations are more likely to promote coherence 
in norms and policy positions across the union movement crucial to the mitigation of cleavages, 
and the general disposition of such encompassing union peaks is to champion broad social justice 
goals (Hall 2017).  
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 The presence of unions within the state is also important. The integration of unions 
within policy-making forms (e.g., advisory boards and commissions) and administrative units in 
mature welfare states is not only likely to offer points of political leverage for the union 
movement (Swank 2002), it is also likely to foster support for redistributive programs among 
trade unions. As Gordon (2015) argues, the presence of Ghent system union predominance in the 
administration of unemployment compensation, and to a lesser extent joint union-employer 
administration of broad social insurance programs, is likely to cultivate union support of these 
programs as a vehicle of union maintenance and recruitment of members.  
 In sum, key features of encompassing union organization should integrate the core 
postindustrial constituencies of left parties, foster broad commitments to social justice and 
inclusive policies, and otherwise facilitate social democratic parties’ pursuit of policies that 
address the needs of outsiders. And, as foreshadowed in Walter Korpi’s (1983) seminal work on 
social democracy, encompassing union movements, at a rudimentary electoral level, still have 
large, significant effects on electoral mobilization (Radcliff and Davis 2000) and votes for left 
parties (Arndt and Rennwald 2016) in postindustrial democracies. 
2.2 A Note on Employers Organization 
 I also account for employer organization. Specifically, Martin and Swank (2012) have 
pointed out that high levels of employers’ organization cultivate a collective orientation to the 
long-run interests of employers (for instance, an interest in human capital). In addition, the 
repeated exchanges with labor and the state that occur at high levels of organization build trust, 
reciprocity and a commitment to the public interest among employers. These considerations, 
along with the tendency of highly organized employers to support social insurance that bolsters 
worker investment in specific skills, suggest that the greater the employer organization, the 
greater the social protection for outsider policies; Martin and Swank report clear evidence for 
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this proposition in the case of ALMP.  
3 An Empirical Analysis of the Partisan Basis of Outsider Policies and 
Outcomes 
 In the following analysis, I focus on the four dimensions of outsider policies and 
outcomes discussed above: low-wage worker unemployment benefits, means-tested income 
protection, ALMP, and reduction in relative poverty. I draw on the large literature of the 
determinants of social and labor market policies and outcomes and develop and estimate 
empirical models of variations across space and time in outsider policies and poverty reduction 
for 13 to 18 developed capitalist democracies (see Table 1) for the years 1979-2012.8 The 
general model of outsider policies and poverty reduction is:  
[Eq. 1] Outsider Policy/Poverty Reductioni,t  = α +  β1 (Partisan Govt )i,mean t-10/5/3 to t-1 + 
β2(Labor Organization)i,t-1  +  Β3(Position of the Median Citizen/Income Skew)i,t-1  + 
β4(Employer Organization)i,t-1 + β5(Trade Openness.)i,t-1 +  β6(Capital Mobility)i,t-1 + 
β7(De-industrialization)i,t-1 + β8(Unemployment)i,t-1+ β8(Percent Change in Real per 
capita GDP)i,t-1 + εi,t , 
In the model of ALMP, I add a control for variations in skills demand of the economy in the 
form of a technological change variable. For the poverty reduction model, I add the lagged level 
of poverty reduction to tap autoregressive processes (see below for more on this point).  
 For core political variables, I measure partisan control of government in the short and 
intermediate term. I do so for two reasons. First, effects of long-term cumulative partisan 
measures of left government are difficult to separate from those of labor union organization as 
                                                 
8 Data series begin between 1979 and the early 1980s and typically end around 2010-to-2012; Nelson’s data are 
available for 1990 to 2009 only. LIS household poverty data are typically available for time points every five years; 
the three low-income benefit measures are measured annually. 
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they co-evolve across time. Second, much of the debate about the political sources of social 
protection and redistribution involves discerning the impact of alternation in Left, Center and 
Right governments in the postindustrial era. That is, do partisan outcomes of democratic 
elections still fundamentally matter today? Long-term cumulative measures stretching back 
several decades give us limited power to address this question. Thus, I assess partisan impacts in 
the short term with a measure of the average ideological position of government over the last 
three years.9 Short-term (three-year) measures allow us to assess the relatively immediate policy 
effects of partisan policy choices. I also examine mean ideological scores of governments over 
the preceding five and 10 years. These measures of intermediate-term power in office are 
assessed because policy changes are often phased in over a few years and frequently take the 
form of discrete, limited reforms whose effects accumulate over an intermediate period of time. I 
use both short- and intermediate-term measures, alternatively, in each model, and, ultimately, 
report the most substantively and significantly important measure.10 
 The organization of labor is measured as a standard score index of union density, a 0.0 to 
4.0 scale of centralization of powers in the largest national peak association (control of affiliate 
appointments, over strikes, of bargaining strategy, and of conflict funds), and a 0.0 to 1.0 scale of 
integration of unions into public policymaking forums. Employer organization is measured 
through a standard score index of the presence of a national employers’ peak association, 0.0 to 
4.0 scale of powers of the peak (control of affiliate appointments, over lockouts, of bargaining 
                                                 
9 I measure the partisan control of government by weighting the ideological position of each governing party with 
that party’s share of total governing parties’ parliamentary (lower chamber) seats, and summing the score for all 
governing parties The ideological position of each party is based on the party’s score on the 26-item scale of 
government intervention in markets and society developed in the Manifesto Data Collection project (Volkens et al 
2013). The resulting variable is scaled 0.0 to 100 (where 100 is the most left-leaning score possible). 
10 In addition, I substituted the annual share of Left party cabinet portfolios, a common alternative measure of 
partisan government, and I note these very similar results below. Overall, measures of multicollinearity reveal the 
short- and intermediate term measures have low associations with the standard set of exogenous variables, including 
labor organization (e.g., R-squares of .1 to .4).  
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strategy, and of conflict funds), and 0.0 to 1.0 scale of policymaking integration of employers. 
 As to the economic position of the median citizen, I follow the conceptualization and 
measurement procedures of Lupu and Pontusson (2011) and use a ratio of ratios, or income 
skew: I compute the ratios of earners at the 90th and 50th percentiles and at the 50th and 10th 
percentiles. As suggested by theory, I use the ratio of these two numbers to capture relative 
closeness of median citizen/voter to low income earners.  
 As to globalization, I control for imports and exports of goods and services as percentage 
of  GDP and a general measure of capital mobility (0.0 to 100 scale of liberalization of capital 
flows); substitutions of trade with developing countries and actual capital flows produce results 
similar to those reported below for the main measures. Technological change in the ALMP 
equation is measured as patents per one million population (OECD 2011). As to structural 
economic change, I follow Iversen and Cusack (2000) and measure deindustrialization as 100 
minus industrial and agricultural employment as a percentage share of the working age 
population. Unemployment is measured as the percentage of the civilian work force unemployed 
(standardized across nations). As an additional control for economic conditions, I use growth 
rates in real per capita GDP (in international prices). I employ a one year lag of all variables 
unless otherwise noted. 
 To assess the effects of partisan government across levels of union organization, I 
estimate Eq. 1 with interaction terms; the equation for each measure of low-income policy and 
relative poverty reduction is as follows: 
[Eq. 2] Outsider Policy/Poverty Reductioni,t  = α +  β1 (Partisan Govt )i,mean t-10/5/3 to t-1 + 
β2(Labor Organization)i,t-1  + … β9(Social Democratic Govt × Labor Organization)i,t-1 + 
εi,t , 
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 For estimation of outsider policy models, I use Prais-Winsten regression with first-order 
serial correlation and panel correct standard errors. In addition, as the time series for some 
nations occasionally begin after 1979 or end before 2012, I use a standard technique for 
unbalanced panels where elements of the variance-covariance matrix are computed with all 
available pairs of panels. As noted, for relative poverty reduction models that rely on data with 
somewhat variable numbers of years between observations, I use OLS regression with panel-
correct standard errors and a lagged dependent variable– a common alternative to Prais-Winsten 
regression (Beck and Katz, 1996). To assess robustness of results (and check for potential bias 
from unmodeled country or time effects), I re-estimate all models with fixed and random effects 
estimators.11 
4. Findings 
 The results of the analysis of the partisan basis of income protections for low-wage 
earners are presented in Table 2. As the table reveals, the general impact of left partisan 
government on unemployment benefit replacement rates and minimum income protection is 
indeed significant. In concrete terms, a shift, let’s say, in partisan government of 25 points on the 
100-point ideological scale would increase unemployment compensation replacement rates for 
low-wage workers by 2.8 percent (25 × .1111) and means-tested benefits (as a percentage of an 
average production worker’s wage) by 4.5 percent (25 × .1809).12  This magnitude of partisan 
change would be, for instance, equivalent to a shift from a moderate center-right government to a 
moderate center-left one. In addition, it is important to note that the direct impact of labor 
                                                 
11 I do not use, for instance, a fixed effects estimator as my standard estimator because of the need to assess 
theoretically important variables with heavily cross-national variation (e.g., labor organization). In any case, fixed 
and random effects estimations reproduce the pattern of findings presented below.  
12 Measures of party government over the previous five and 10 years produce modestly stronger findings than the 
three-year average score, I use the 10-year measure in all models as it proves slightly more robust than the five-year 
average.  
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organization on unemployment benefits for low income workers is substantively large and 
statistically significant; a one (standard deviation) unit increase in the index of labor organization 
(for instance, a move from the degree of 1980s labor organization in New Zealand to the level in 
the Netherlands) would, itself, increase income replacement rates by three and a half percent. 
While positive, the substantive direct effect of union organization on minimum income 
protection is smaller and not significant at conventional levels.  
-Table 2 about here- 
The second and fourth columns of Table 2 present the results for the basic assessment of 
the core hypothesis of the chapter, namely, that Left government impacts on income protection 
for outsiders will differ across levels of labor organization. As the table suggests, the coefficient 
for the interaction between partisan government and labor organization is not significant for 
unemployment compensation; it is, however, clearly significant in the case of minimum income 
protection. Moreover, when one applies the advice of Kam and Franzese (2009) to the current 
context and examines marginal impacts of partisan government across specific levels of labor 
organization, it becomes clear that alternation in partisan governments has little impact on both 
types of outsider income protection when labor organization is low (e.g., Britain and the United 
States). Partisan impacts are, however, significant and substantively important for outsider 
policies at medium and high levels of labor organization.13 For low wage unemployment 
benefits, the impact of a 25 point upward shift in party government ideological position at 
medium levels of union organization (e.g., the Netherlands) is 2.8; at high levels of union 
organization (e.g., Austria and Denmark) the replacement rate impact is 3.4 percentage points. 
                                                 
13  Recall that the effect of some variable X1 on Y at variable levels of X2 is given by  β1 +  β3[X2], where β3 is the 
coefficient for the interaction of X1 and X2. Standard errors for these marginal effects are readily computed (Kam 
and Franzese 2009).  
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An identical pattern emerges with respect to minimum income protection benefits, and this is 
highlighted in Figure 2. As labor organization rises, the effect of social democratic government 
increases in substantive magnitude and significancr. At high levels of union organization, 
benefits relative to median wages increase over seven percentage points under a left-leaning 
versus right-leaning government. 
-Figure 2 about here- 
The estimates of the effects of the models’ other variables are presented in subsequent 
rows of Table 2. While of secondary interest here, one might note the following findings: core 
features of globalization, trade and capital openness, bolster the level of unemployment benefits 
for low wage workers; globalization’s impacts are also positive and near significant in the 
minimum income protection models. In addition, there are substantively large need effects. For 
unemployment benefits, slow economic growth is associated with relatively more generous 
support for low-wage workers; for minimum income protection, high unemployment is 
associated with more generous assistance. Finally, two additional findings might be mentioned: 
employer organization is positively associated with both forms of outsider policy, but these 
effects are only significant for minimum income protection. Second, deindustrialization has a 
significant, negative impact on minimum income protection. One interpretation for this finding is 
that deindustrialization generally promotes the shift to an activation strategy and this, in turn, 
inherently entails reductions in the generosity of long-term income assistance for outsiders.  
-Table 3 about here- 
 The results of the analysis of partisan and labor organization impacts on ALMP and 
poverty reduction are presented in Table 3. As in the case of income protection for low income 
workers, left party government is associated with significantly higher AMLP spending and 
poverty reduction than under center-right governments. The direct impacts of party government 
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are substantively important. As shown in the first column, a shift of 25 points in the ideological 
position of the government (for instance, a move from a center-right to center-left government) 
would shift ALMP spending by .1 (25×.0036). Given that mean ALMP spending as a percent of 
GDP is .8, this change in resource commitments for ALMP is not trivial. Similarly, a 25 point 
shift in government is associated with a 4 percent point increase (25× .1601) in pre-fisc to post-
fisc relative poverty reduction. The direct impacts of labor organization (first and third columns) 
are also substantively important:  ALMP spending and poverty reduction increase .1 and 3.7, 
respectively, for a one (standard deviation) unit change in labor organization.  
 With regard to the mediation of partisan government effects by labor organization, Table 
3 illustrates that higher labor organization, as expected, intensifies the impact of party 
government on ALMP. For instance, at average levels of labor organization (0.0 on the standard 
score index), the impact of a one unit change in party government is .0031.14 At moderately high 
labor organization (say a standard score index value of 1), the partisan government impact is 
.0081 (.0031+.0050×1.0). If we use a 25 point shift on the ideological position scale as the 
magnitude in change in party government, ALMP spending would increase by .1 at average 
levels and .2 at moderately high levels of labor organization with such a partisan change. On the 
other hand, the interaction between party government and labor organization is not significant in 
the poverty reduction model. Yet, recalling Kam and Franzese’s (2009) suggestion, when we 
examine individual marginal effects of partisan government we do see important differences in 
party impacts across levels of labor organization: party alternation in power has no effect on the 
magnitude of poverty reduction at low levels of labor organization but substantively important 
ones at moderate and high amounts of labor organization (3.9 and 4.6 percent, respectively).  
                                                 
14 Recall that the impact of x1 when the mediating variable, x2,is 0.0, is given by the coefficient for the direct effect  
of x1 in the equation. 
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 With respect to other factors in the model, three findings deserve note. Employers’ 
organization has significant positive effects, as predicted by Martin and Swank (2012), on 
ALMP; it is also significantly associated with poverty reduction in one of two models (and 
nearly so in the other).15 Second, increases in international capital mobility are significantly 
related to ALMP spending, although international openness variables are not associated with 
poverty reduction. Finally, needs have substantial impacts on both ALMP and poverty reduction. 
In the case ALMP, a drop in economic growth and a rise unemployment rates both significantly 
increase ALMP spending. For poverty reduction, an increase in unemployment has a large 
substantive effect on the magnitude of poverty reduction: a one percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate would, alone, increase poverty reduction by roughly 1.3 percent points.  
5 Conclusions 
This chapter speaks to a central question in the debate over the nature of the new politics 
of the welfare state, namely, does partisan government shape the state’s responses to the 
challenges of new social risks in postindustrial society? Specifically, I analyze the impacts of 
partisan government on policies to address labor market dualism from the perspective of 
coalition building by social democratic parties. I find systematic empirical evidence that left 
parties have significant, substantively important impacts on key features of income protection for 
low income workers, ALMP, and pre- to post-fisc relative poverty reduction in the 1980s to 
2010s period. These results are also in line with the contributors to Armingeon and Bonoli 
(2006) who stressed the general importance of the power resources model in explaining policies 
to address new social risks; the findings are also line with other scholars such as Korpi and 
                                                 
15 It is relevant to mention that as predicted by Swank and Martin (2001), the impacts of Left party government on 
ALMP also increase at higher levels of employer organization; this is not the case, however, with income protection 
variables nor poverty reduction.  
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Palme (2003) and Hou (2009) who continue to stress the central importance of social democratic 
government to egalitarian social policy in the postindustrial era.  
This paper also highlights the importance of the organization of producer interests to 
postindustrial welfare state politics. As Paul Pierson (2016) recently noted in a commentary on 
Beramendi et al’s (2015) sweeping analytical assessment of trajectories of economic and social 
policy in advanced postindustrial capitalism, the role electoral politics, coalition building, and 
partisanship is central to the explanation of policy change; the role of class organization is not. 
The arguments and findings presented here are both complementary to this recent work and 
implicitly critical of it. On the one hand, this paper’s arguments and findings confirm the 
importance of electoral politics in shaping responses to the challenges of labor market dualism. 
On the other hand, my findings diverge from Beramendi et al (2015), Iversen and Soskice 
(2015a), and others who minimize the importance of class organization in the contemporary 
periods. As this chapter shows, encompassing labor organization has a significant, substantively 
large direct effect on social policies for outsiders and, ultimately their relative economic status; 
labor organization also systematically mediates the capacity of partisan governments to 
adjudicate deep divisions between core constituencies and, in turn, pursue solidaristic policies 
that address the needs of outsiders. Moreover, as stressed by Martin and Swank (2004; 2012), 
one must also recognize the importance of employer organization for some forms of inclusive 
social and labor market policy. This is especially the case in the area of ALMP; earlier evidence 
offered by Martin and Swank on the salience of employer organization is reinforced here with 
new analyses of ALMP that extend over a decade into the 21st century.  
 In sum, the analysis and conclusions of this chapter reinforce the initial assessments of 
Armingeon and collaborators as well as the array of like-minded scholars discussed above: the 
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politics of new social risks, and especially the politics of inclusive social and labor market 
policy, is a story of the dynamics of coalition building in advanced postindustrial society, the 
continued importance partisan government, and the power of organized interests. This story is 
not unlike, in broad structural terms, the well-established narrative of the politics of 20th century 
welfare state development.   
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Appendix: Data Sources  
 
 
Outsider Policies and Relative Poverty Reduction: 
 
 ALMP: OECD iLibrary (Social Expenditures Data Base).  
 
 Minimum Income Protection for Outsiders:  social protection data from Nelson (2007); 
average production worker’s wage is from Van Vliet & Caminada (2012). 
 
 Unemployment Benefits for the Low Income Production Worker:  Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef 
Jahn, and Kati Kuitto. 2017. “Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2. Version 2017-09.” 
University of Connecticut & University of Greifswald. 
 
 Relative Poverty Reduction: computed from data in the Luxembourg Income Study 
nation micro-files. LIS micro-files available at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lis-
database/ (Microdata accessed during March and April 2013).  
 
Politics: 
 
 The Wage Position of the Median Wage Earner (90/50 to 50/10 Ratios): OECD iLibrary 
(Earnings Data Base). 
 
 Party Government-Ideological Position: Party Manifesto Data Collection project as 
described in in A. Volkens (2013).  
 
 Party Government-Cabinet Portfolios: Duane Swank, “Comparative Parties Dataset,” 
http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml.  
 
 Union Organization: All variables are from Visser (2013). 
 
 Employer Organization: Data for 1955-1992: Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange (2009); for 
1993-1997: Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel (2001); for late 1990s-2010: Traxler and Humer 
(2007), country specific sources and labor and industrial relations periodicals. 
  
 
Post-industrialization, Business Cycles, and Needs: 
 
 International Capital Mobility: data from Dennis Quinn,Graduate School of Business, 
Georgetown University. 
 
Trade Openness: components from OECD iLibrary.  
 
 FDI Outflows: International Monetary Fund (selected years b); GDP: OECD iLibrary 
(National Accounts). 
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 Technological Change: Patents: OECD iLibrary (Patent Statistics Database). Population: 
OECD iLibrary (Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data Base). 
 
 Deindustrialization: OECD iLibrary, (Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data 
Base). 
 
 Unemployment: OECD iLibrary,(Employment and Labor Market Statistics Data Base).  
 
 Per Capita Real GDP in International Prices: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012) 
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Table 1. Income Protection for Outsiders, Active Labor Market Spending, and Relative Poverty Rates in Postindustrial Democracies, 1980s – 2010sa 
 
  Unemployment 
Comp RR Low 
Wage Worker 
 Minimum 
Income 
Protection 
Cash and In-
kind Benefits 
 ALMP 
Spending 
(Percent of 
GDP) 
 Relative 
Poverty 
Reduction 
(% Change, 
Pre- to Post-
Fisc) 
 
 Mid-1980s Early 2010s Mid-1980s Late 2000s Mid-1980s Early 2010s Mid-1980s Early 2010s 
Nordic          
  Denmark 94 96 56 48 .8 2.0 50 57 
  Finland 84 78 69 54 .8 1.0 68 58 
  Norway 80 80 59 55 .5 .6 49 63 
  Sweden 04 88 69 55 1.9 1.2 55 68 
Mean 88 86 63 53 1.0 1.2 56 62 
Continental          
Austria 73 68 51 49 .3 .8 NA NA 
  Belgium 92 92 38 34 1.2 1.1 NA NA 
  France 74 75 44 40 .7 1.0 55 61 
  Germany 74 72 45 49 .7 .8 35 46 
Italy 30 80 48 53 .3 .4 NA NA 
  Netherlands 81 84 43 44 1.3 1.1 57 44 
  Switzerland 76 88 59 55 .2 .6 11 7 
Mean 71 79 47 46 .7 .7 40 40 
Anglo-Liberal         
  Australia 45 38 38 41 .3 .3 30 38 
  Canada 72 72 51 41 .5 .3 38 38 
Ireland 76 82 54 66 1.1 .9 56 74 
New Zealand 74 62 48 47 .8 .3 NA NA 
  United Kingdom 60 52 39 48 .8 .4 41 51 
  United States 77 74 28 20 .3 .2 6 28 
Mean 67 63 43 44 .6 .4 34 38 
Japan (mixed) 78 82 51 72 .3 .2 NA NA 
Overall Mean 74 75 47 48 .7 .7 42 46 
 
a Table 1 reports unemployment compensation income replacement rate for 1985 and 2010 while minimum income protections is for 1990 and 2009. The table 
reports 1985-87 and 2010-2012 means for ALMP spending variable, and a mid-1980s and 2010 data points for reduction in relative poverty.  
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Table 2.  Partisan Politics, Labor Organization and Income Protection for Labor Market Outsiders. 
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 Unemployment 
Comp RR 
Unemployment 
Comp RR 
Minimum 
Benefits 
Minimum 
Benefits 
Left Government  
 
.1111** 
(.0444) 
.1083** 
(.0446) 
.1809** 
(.392) 
.1772** 
(.0376) 
Labor Organization  
 
3.5084** 
(1.1079) 
2.5115 
(2.0960) 
.9648 
(1.1038) 
-3.4167 
(2.3140) 
Left Government × Union Organization 
 
--- .0209 
(.0356) 
--- .0900** 
(.0410) 
Economic Position of the Median Citizen 
 
.3950 
(4.770) 
.5896 
(4.7899) 
-7.7668 
(4.4055) 
-6.4350 
(4.3478) 
Employers Organization 
 
.6798 
(1.1820) 
.6348 
(1.1888) 
3.9214** 
(1.2332) 
3.9896** 
(1.1650) 
Trade Openness   
 
.0541** 
(.0184) 
.0547** 
(.0185 
.0017 
(.0017) 
.0054 
(.0168) 
Capital Market Openness  
 
.0501** 
(.0302) 
.0508** 
(.0302) 
.0470 
(.0378) 
.0438 
(.0373) 
Deindustrialization  
 
.0249 
(.1369 
.0168 
(.1384) 
-1.0318** 
(.1838) 
-1.0876** 
(.1828) 
Economic Growth Rate 
 
-.1379** 
(.0588) 
-.1394** 
(.0589) 
-.0746 
(.0702) 
-.0810 
(.0704) 
Unemployment  
 
-.1331 
(.1496) 
-.1288 
(.1499) 
.2818** 
(.1331) 
.3134** 
(.1318) 
Constant 59.8044 60.1783 123.3917 126.5812 
R2 .7976 .7979 .7873 .7903 
Observations 434 434 340 340 
 
Models of the unemployment compensation replacement rate for low income workers are estimated with 1978-2010  
data for 18 advanced democracies (see Table 1) by OLS regression; models of minimum income supports are estimated 
with 1990 to 2009 data. The table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-correct standard errors. 
 
* significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table 3.  Partisan Politics, Labor Organization, ALMP and the Reduction of Relative Poverty for Labor Market 
Outsiders. 
 ALMP Spending 
(% GDP) 
ALMP Spending 
(% GDP) 
Poverty 
Reduction 
Poverty 
Reduction 
Left Government  
 
.0036** 
(.0023) 
.0031* 
(.0020) 
.1601** 
(.0766) 
.1577** 
(.0795) 
Labor Organization  
 
.0998** 
(.0506) 
-.1398 
(.1173) 
4.706** 
(2.4201) 
3.7467 
(4.2945) 
Left Government × Union Organization 
 
--- .0050** 
(.0021) 
--- .0188 
(.0730) 
Economic Position of the Median Citizen 
 
.0627 
(.1712) 
.0904 
(.1701) 
-2.1445 
(9.2321) 
-1.7683 
(9.0349) 
Employers Organization 
 
.2599** 
(.0815) 
.2550** 
(.0804) 
2.5703 
(2.0025) 
2.5741* 
(2.0039) 
Technological Change 
 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
-.0001 
(.0002) 
--- --- 
Trade Openness   
 
.0008 
(.0011) 
.0009 
(.0011) 
-.0823 
(.0872) 
-.0778 
(.0659) 
Capital Market Openness  
 
.0026** 
(.0014) 
.0026** 
(.0013) 
.0929 
(.0886) 
.0875 
(.0967) 
Deindustrialization  .0048 .0042 .3832** .3762* 
32 
 
 (.0053 (.0053) (.2444) (.2406) 
Economic Growth Rate 
 
-.0096** 
(.0030) 
-.0089** 
(.0030) 
-.0197 
(.2407) 
-.0256 
(.2387) 
Unemployment  
 
.0211** 
(.0077) 
.0221** 
(.0076) 
1.3071** 
(.4186) 
1.3287** 
(.4562) 
Poverty Reduction Previous Period 
 
--- --- .6405** 
(.0838) 
.6416** 
(.0828) 
Constant -.2548 -.2403 -30.5050 -29.9139 
R2 .2574 .2667 .8759 .8760 
Observations 454 454 77 77 
 
Models of ALMP spending are estimated with 1979-2012 data for 18 advanced democracies by OLS regression; 
models of relative poverty are estimated with early 1980s to 2010 data for 13 nations. The table reports 
unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-correct standard errors. 
 
* significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Figure 1. Three Sets of Tradeoffs in Social Democratic Party Coalition Building in 
Advanced Postindustrial Societies. 
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Figure 2: Left Party Effects on Minimum Benefits
